Steve Weber / Politics and Economics

research, arguments, ideas, and musings about what is uncertain and important in international political economy

Of Tony Soprano and Neil Smelser

What do Tony Soprano and Neil Smelser  have in common?  No, this isn’t the beginning of a terrible joke.  The answer is, they both taught me a great deal about ambivalence.

The Neil Smelser part first.  Neil is a sociologist and University Professor at UC Berkeley.  Which probably explains why I never met him at Berkeley.  In fact I only got to know Neil during 1997, when he was the director and I was a fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences in Palo Alto.

People at the CASBS often form little interest groups that meet every other week or so to discuss a paper, or an argument, or just to discuss.  I was lucky enough to be part of a group that was talking about rationality and how the concept gets used, abused, developed, and sometimes ‘tested’ in social science. 

At some point during the year Neil shared with us a draft paper on the meaning of ambivalence, which later become the basis of his Presidential address to the American Sociology Association .

This was one of those simple (by which I mean elegant) papers whose core arguments stay with you forever.  Neil asked about the nature of ambivalence as a state of human mind and how we could reason about it, as well as what kinds of behaviors you would expect from an ambivalent person.   His core insight:  there are many many things in life that we hold both very positive feelings toward, and very negative feelings toward, at the same time.  Some obvious examples might be – a new luxury car about which we feel guilty for spending so much money; your mother; success on the part of someone you really don’t like very much.

Let’s take my mother as an example (she’s unlikely to be reading this, thank goodness).  I love my mother enormously, AND she drives me crazy.  In rational choice language, I hold a positive emotional valence toward her that I’ll call for the sake of it a value of +10.  And at exactly the same time I hold a negative emotional valence toward her that has the value -7.  That is almost the definition of ambivalence.  Where simple rational choice – inspired preference modeling would go wrong, is in SUMMING up those two values and suggesting that I actually hold an overall positive preference toward my mother with an intensity of +3.  If you tried to understand my behavior towards my mother on the basis of a +3 valence, you’d be completely confused.  In fact, the one thing I am never toward my mother, is lukewarm (ie +3).  Instead, I tend to swing like a pendulum between behaviors that are more consistent with +10 and those that are more consistent with -7.

I think an enormous amount of human behavior and human thought, both individual and in aggregate (like with societies and countries), is better characterized and understood in terms of the ambivalence that lies behind it, than with unidimensional measures of preferences.  That has implications for all sorts of social science modeling that we do.  But I don’t want to address that here.  Instead I want to use three examples from current political discussions to illustrate how ambivalence works and how hard it is for the actors involved to understand not only their own ambivalence sometimes, but most importantly the ambivalence that lies behind the behavior of other actors in their ecosystem.

Example 1:  What words do I hear people use when they talk about ‘globalization’?  They say things like complexity, acceleration, connectivity, and interdependence.  And each of these words have positive and negative valences at the same time.  So:

Complexity:  interesting and rich, but also fragile and vulnerable
Acceleration:  exciting and new, but also leaving you behind
Connectivity:  access to everything all the time, but also vulnerable to massive, cascading failure
Interdependence:  strength, but also vulnerability

There it is: ambiguity at it’s best.  And I have argued many times that the higher order strategic thinking for people and organizations depends on living WITH that ambiguity, not trying to reduce it to a single valence.  In other words, holding the tension between these emotional responses in constructive co-existence, not letting them tear you apart, and not letting yourself believe that only one side of the equation is operating.  Or vacillating unpredictably between them, cycling back and forth.  Those are dysfunctional and exhausting behaviors.  And they make it incredibly hard for anyone else, whether it be your partner or your customer or another major global power in an emerging bipolar relationship (hint!) to understand why you are acting the way you are and what that signals about your vital interests and intentions.

Example 2:  The London subway bombing.
Everyone is trying (and just beginning, really) to make sense of what this means.  How are we reading this right now in terms of our thinking about the severity of the threat to things like mass transit systems in major cities?
Ambivalence again.  I see a bit of pendulum swing going on in people’s gut assessments over whether the entire ecosystem of something like a modern city at the broadest level, as well as particular subsystems within that city, are incredibly fragile, or actually incredibly robust.    Here are two ways people’s beliefs are playing out.  The terrorist attack shows that :
            ‘a modern city is such an interconnected organism, with all its resources stretched to the bone in the relentless drive for efficiency, that it would not take much to bring the whole thing crashing down’

                OR
            ‘a modern city is such a complex and interconnected organism, with so many redundant pathways available to intelligent agents, that it is incredibly and surprisingly robust.  You hit it somewhere, and it routes around the damage then self-heals in ways that you couldn’t foresee’

Note that the mood today is mostly to default to the former interpretation… the second usually enters the discussion as a contrarian view.  But to understand peoples’ behavior and responses to these events, you actually have to understand the ambivalence inherent in co-mingling of those two arguments.  It’s why people get on the subway at the same time that they are scared out of their wits and talking about what a horrible thing could happen to them today.

Example 3:  Tony Soprano
You had to wonder how Tony was coming in to this discussion.  I love The Sopranos.  I think it is the best drama I’ve seen in the movies, tv, or just about any kind of entertainment in the last few years.  I love it because Tony Soprano’s character is a finely articulated study in the power of ambivalence.  I love Tony, and I hate him in nearly equal measure (so do most of the characters on the show, by the way).  Here’s why it’s so brilliant:  just when the two sides of my emotional valence toward Tony are about to collapse into a definitive, unidimensional preference (for example, when he kicks someone nearly to death because he didn’t pay the protection money on time, or when he lies to Carmela – how could anyone lie to Edie Falco?) he immediately does something that pulls me back from the brink – showing his love to his children, or helping out his dead father’s ex-mistress who was cheated out of her share of a deal.  And I’m back in the space of ambivalence. 

Of course it’s uncomfortable to be in that space.  But it’s human life, and I think its social life, business life, and political life as well.  I’m going to keep my eyes on the fast moving US-China relationship this week to focus on the behavioral manifestations of ambivalence in that relationship – and evidence for how confusing it is to the other side.


24 July 2005 | Permalink | Comments (3)

Context....

My most recent work, pretty much absorbing the last couple years of my life, has focused on the political economy of the open source software community.  My book, The Success Of Open Source, is here.  You can read a reasonably detailed review of it on FirstMonday  and elsewhere on the web. 

18 July 2005 | Permalink | Comments (29) | TrackBack (1)

What's happening in Chinese - American relations?

I've decided, after much thought and some (probably irrational) resistance, to experiment with a new means of disseminating my work and research.

So, to start, I want to summarize a talk that I've given twice in the last few weeks -- and am developing for a written piece, as soon as I can.

I’ve been thinking a lot the past year about the evolution of the relationship between the US and China. As 9-11 recedes (a little bit) into the background, China is returning to where it was in the summer of 2001 – first on the list of American foreign policy concerns.

The core argument of my talk is painfully simple: the Sino-American relationship is now central to the health of the global political economy, but it is not a healthy relationship. Stories about globalization and economic interdependence are important but they distract people's attention from the core of the relationship -- which is political.

I discuss three problems that need to be managed between the US and China -- urgently. They are conflicts over currency, over energy, and over property rights. How these issues are managed will tell us a great deal about the future character of what is now a bipolar relationship.

In fact it is a co-dependent, but asymmetrical, bipolar relationship – which makes it more unstable than the bipolarity we became familiar with between the US and the Soviet Union during the Cold War.

This relationship is threatened by attempts that each side will make to leverage asymmetrical interdependence. In simple language, the US is dependent on Chinese purchases of dollar assets to sustain the crazy yield curves of low long-term interest rates. The Chinese are dependent on continued US household spending (driven by low interest rates, the housing bubble they produce, and the resultant wealth effect on homeowners who now save almost nothing and spend the proceeds of their home equity loans on Chinese – made goods at Ikea). That’s codependency, but it’s asymmetrical in a profound sense. Break the relationship, and the US risks recession and stagflation. The Chinese risk revolution – after all, 9% growth keeps the middle class on the track toward wealth and farm workers coming into the Chinese industrial economy employed. A recession in the US is a nuisance. A recession in China could mean the end of the communist party rule. If you are sitting in Beijing and watching John Snow pressuring you to float your currency, wouldn’t you wonder if this is a low-cost non-military US strategy aimed at regime change in China?

Sino-American bipolarity is also threatened by the ability of lots of third parties to free-ride to their hearts content on the co-dependence. The US put up with a significant amount of free-riding on the dollar and on US defense expenditures during the Cold War. Of course, it was our allies that were free-riding back then, and in a real sense we saw it as something of an investment in their economic and political recovery. So Cold War free-riding was mainly about our NATO allies not paying their ‘fair share’ for defense.

My point here is not only that the US was willing to tolerate some of this. It’s that this kind of free-riding had a downside limit. Countries can’t put their defense budget below zero and impose more costs on the US that way.

Today, free-riding on the US-China currency bargain has essentially no boundaries. Are you a third party that wants to take advantage of the situation? You can multiply your bet to an unprecedented degree through financial leverage--- crazy negative amortization mortgages, hedge fund investments, and all sorts of other exotic financial instruments. There’s really no limit to what people can do here that impose costs on the bilateral bargain.

And people get smart about this very fast. I think the single biggest boost to innovation in the financial sector the last few years has been the opportunity to find new ways to arbitrage against the dollar - renminbi standard.

So it’s not just that Washington and Beijing have guns to each other’s heads, it’s that everyone else is running around emptying our pockets while we stand there.

This is as much a power game as a wealth game. That doesn't have to be bad news, but the sooner we get serious about it, the more likely we are to navigate through more successfully. History provides some examples of what NOT to do -- after all, the American record of managing bipolar relationships with a peer competitor in the 20th century is not a good one. More on that point later.

18 July 2005 | Permalink | Comments (15)

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